The August riots that erupted in London, then spread to other cities in the UK were unlike any that had been experienced before in the western world. On August 4, a 29 year old black male was shot by London Metro Police while sitting in a cab. Eyewitness statements and forensic evidence did not agree with the police statements about the shooting.
Riots broke out as more evidence of suspicious police conduct was reported. The typical UK government response of publishing an old, but “thuggish” looking photo of the victim, then blaming the whole situation on race and crime, specifically Black crime, added fuel to the fire.
But something changed after the rioting started. Well organized, racially diverse, agile and effectively coordinated groups of young people appeared, engaged in looting, then disappeared before authorities could even think of responding. The slow moving machine that recalls, outfits and dispatches the specialized riot control forces proved to be no match for the new world order of groups who plan, execute, then escape.
In an alarming development for the wealthy and well protected, it became apparent that no area of London and no town in the UK was immune from well planned and executed courses of mob and group action. Specific socioeconomic or racial groups of actors and instigators were not so easily identifiable. Isolating and apprehending the more obvious troublemakers quickly became an elusive goal.
In the past, riots or protests were confined to specific neighborhoods or action centers.The riot participants were identifiable by skin color, dress and other common identifiers of class, social group, or status as protestors.
Riots tend to have specific triggers. Some action within the crowd or by the police will mob behavior in a localized neighborhood or part of town. Only those who are knowledgeable about the social problem or a specific sequence of events will be involved in the immediate eruptions of protest and outrage. Traditionally, a specific area can be blocked off, and police are able to suppress the crowds, often with brutality, impunity, and excessive force.
Now, a group can appear in one part of the city, then quickly disperse or move to any other part of the city. Groups can show up in a neighboring town or come in from the suburbs. The groups have no identifiable command and control center, so there is often no way to predict where the next action will occur.
How is this happening? Civilians have figured out the principles of military tactical operations and will use cell phones for command and control. But the origins of these amateur tactical operations did not come from rioting or anarchy. Benign flash mobs were the original amateur tactical movements. With advanced planning and coordination, plus command and control through cell phone texts, fairly large groups could suddenly show up at a city center or mall, engage in a fun, but pointless group activity, then disperse before authorities could respond. Later came the large groups and the Broadway musical style of dance routines.
But more dysfunctional elements of society have been using the flash mob tactics in order to coordinate events that led to real trouble. Flash mobs have made random group attacks on individuals. Savvy masterminds have coordinated gang violence, swarm style shoplifting robberies, acts of vandalism and have even managed the secretive underground party scenes.
Now, it takes little or nothing for a group of individuals to plan, schedule and launch anything from entertaining diversions to full out mob violence.
In the UK, the violence spread to towns like Bristol, Liverpool and Leeds. Something had changed. Witnesses and victims described groups of people who appeared to be more focused on stealing than on anti government rage. The slow moving riot control apparatuses were not up to the task of responding to the fast moving and small mobs.
Will monitoring, banning or censoring social networks like Twitter and Facebook solve the problem? Probably not. Facebook and Twitter are better suited to rousing large scale or nationwide protest. Constant communication through texting and voice conversations are the engines for carrying out specific actions in specific locations. Sending text messages, sharing images, and engaging in voice communication are far superior to making easily monitored public postings on glorified message boards like Twitter or Facebook.
Will commercial areas and wealthier areas be able to have more security? Probably not, since those areas contain their own populations of troubled, even more well financed, better outfitted, and even more opportunistic actors. The wealthy have no more psychological immunity than anyone else from getting caught up in a flash protest or flash mob scene. At most, being able to leave or to lock down their area is the best option that wealthy residents will get.
The most important lessons that come from the UK rioting are that, with or without technology, humans will respond as humans tend to do when they have reached what they perceive to be their limits of tolerance. A sub group of humans will use the disruption in order to seek out opportunity wherever they can, and they will use any tools that are available.
The most ominous message is that, when conditions are ripe, one charismatic leader can easily convince many individuals to strike anywhere and at any time, using a combination of bastardized military tactics, flexible strategies, and the latest communications devices in order to behave in unforeseen ways.