USING EARNING CAPACITY in CALCULATING ALIMONY and SUPPORT AWARDS

The leading case addressing earning capacity in Connecticut is Schmidt v. Schmidt , 180 Conn. 184, 429 A.2d 470 (1980). In Schmidt , the Connecticut Supreme Court held that earning capacity can only be used as a basis for alimony and support where there is evidence to support findings of a party’s past income, and also the current income available for the type of work and experience level which the party has performed in the past. The Schmidt case involved a situation in which there was evidence that the defendant husband willfully depleted his earnings in an effort to limit his exposure for alimony and support. The husband appealed the trial court orders, claiming the court did not have before it the proper evidence on which to base its orders. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court stated that although there was evidence that the defendant had substantial income prior to the dissolution proceedings, there was no evidence of specific amounts of income, and no evidence as to current income that could be expected from an employee with the defense, ability and experience. Although the Supreme Court reversed the financial orders on the basis of earning capacity, they set for necessary evidential requirements that must be established for a court to base its financial orders on earning capacity rather than actual earnings.

In Miller v. Miller , 181 Conn. 610, 436 A.2d 279 (1980), the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s financial awards that were based on the defendant husband’s earning capacity, as opposed to his actual earnings. In upholding the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court found that for the better part of the twenty years prior to the commencement of the dissolution action, the husband had been employed with the same company and, “that he voluntarily and unilaterally left his employment at the Savin Corporation several months after the plaintiff had commenced the present action. This resulted in a reduction in his salary.” Id. at 612, 613. The court in Miller , unlike the court in Schmidt , had the proper evidence before it on which to base financial awards on earning capacity rather than actual earnings.

In Hart v. Hart , 19 Conn. App. 91, 561 A.2d 151 (1989), the Connecticut Appellate Court upheld a trial court’s financial awards based upon the earning capacity of the defendant husband as a quality control engineer, as opposed to the income the husband earned cutting lawns. The court based its awards on the fact that the husband held a number of positions as a quality control engineer during the course of the parties’ marriage. In addition, since unilaterally deciding to leave employment in his trained field, the husband had only two interviews for quality control engineering positions, and instead cut lawns for several months of the year in lieu of his “regular” employment. The Appellate Court found that the specific evidence of the husband’s previous earnings coupled with the fact that he voluntarily avoided employment in his trained field, was enough evidence on which to base financial awards on earning capacity as opposed to actual earnings.

In McKay v. McKay , 174 Conn. 1, 381 A.2d 527 (1977), the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision, based on the husband’s earning capacity rather than his actual earnings. In McKay , the husband testified as to his educational background and work experience, as well as his past income. After a substantial career in his field, the husband formed his own corporation, in which he was in control of the finances, including setting his personal salary. The defendant further testified and gave evidence with respect to the average salary for a person of his education and experience. Based upon this evidence, the trial court imposed an earning capacity on the husband, from which it based its orders.


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