Flash mobs in Philadelphia and riots in England had one new element in common: They used mobile technology to coordinate criminal activities. Another common element was that the majority of the criminal activity was perpetrated by teenagers. These two elements when taken together do suggest possible approaches to controlling the use of technology in such circumstances. The following is a thought experiment based on already existing social restrictions.
Since the wide use of the automobile, drivers have been licensed. The purpose is manifold. Licensing provides government funding for transportation related projects such as roads and traffic controls. Licensing also institutes a minimum standard of operational quality, that is, a licensed driver must demonstrate minimum responsibility in terms of ability to operate a vehicle without harming others.
Similar regulations exist for other products and services, and for similar reasons. There are limitations on the purchase and use of cigarettes and alcohol, as well as on voting and gambling. These limitations exist for the same reasons as we license drivers, that is that society has a stake in the imposition of minimum responsibility regarding the use of these products and services. In the face of the criminal use of technology in the United States and England, it follows that society has a stake in the imposition of minimum responsibility regarding the use of mobile technology just as it does with driving, drinking, voting and gambling. To that end, a licensing scheme makes as much sense for mobile technology access by minors.
There are four major arguments which will arise regarding such regulation. These arguments are freedom of speech, the ubiquity of mobile technology, the impact on profits of mobile phone service providers, and the underlying bureaucratic structure required for such a licensing scheme. We will examine these arguments and see if they are overly restrictive or unworkable.
Mobile devices are everywhere. Facebook, Twitter and Blackberry Messenger are integrated into our lives to keep us in touch to the degree that in some cases they are the primary if not only way that some users communicate with the wider world in developing countries. However, in developed countries, a licensing scheme for mobile technology does not prohibit freedom of expression, it merely regulates one mode of expression. Other modes of expression still exist. Therefore, in developed countries, free speech cannot be said to be prevented in this case.
With the Arab Spring, it can even be argued that mobile technology as a mode of expression has had an undeniably positive impact on society, and that it is not possible to bring the ubiquity of mobile technology under control to the distress of dictators worldwide. However, San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit, or BART, recently shut down cell phone transmission briefly in its subway to head off instant communication and coordination via mobile devices in the event of a rumored demonstration. Legal questions of BART’s action aside, the point is that it is conceptually possible to place restrictions on mobile technology access.
The restriction on the sale of alcohol is like but not identical to, the restriction on tobacco sales to minors. The underlying concept is the same, but the mechanics differ. A similar comparison can be made to mobile technology licensing. Every text, tweet and call is identified by device on the mobile network. It is a simple enough technological step to impose a curfew at the mobile network level on devices registered to minors, so that a device may be rendered inoperable except for emergency calls during certain hours.
Despite the legal restriction on alcohol, cigarettes, etc., it must be noted that underage users do in fact have access to these substances. It follows that any restriction on mobile technology will only be partially effective. However, in the case of Philadelphia and England, restricted access would perhaps have been sufficient. If gangs of rioters or looters cannot coordinate instantly their effectiveness is significantly diminished, as is the duration of the period of disorder.
It may be argued that profits will suffer if mobile technology providers cannot provide their services freely to young people. This is especially true at present, since the current generation of young people is the first generation to grow up in a world which has always had the Internet and mobile devices, and as such are more comfortable with, and the greatest consumers of the technology. There are two responses to that argument. First, young people would no doubt add to economic activity if they could drive and drink and smoke and gamble earlier than they can presently. However, society chooses to forgo that excess economic activity in the interest of a stable society. Second, the very newness of mobile technology suggests that at this point the legal and licensing regulations potential has not been adequately examined.
A licensing scheme is certainly possible, and in fact even easy when compared to imposition of limitations on underage drinking and smoking. In fact licensing of mobile technology usage is comparable to licensing driving. A young person, faced with the reality that drinking and smoking are legally prohibited to them, will indulge in these activities in secret. With mobile technology, this is neither desirable nor useful. The point of mobile technology is immediacy, to use this technology, it must be used in the open, and that openness means that a licensing scheme is possible.
The model of prepaid services does not suffer unnecessarily from the imposition of age restrictions. As with smoking, drinking and gambling, it is easily possible to restrict access a reasonable amount of the time based on age. In the case of prepaid mobile services, it would be sufficient to require purchase with a credit card if online or with proof of age when buying in person. Such a model is already reasonably effective for controlling alcohol and tobacco sales.
Mobile service providers will argue that they are not the technology police. Yet mobile service providers are like retailers of alcohol and tobacco in the sense that they sell a product which is dangerous when used irresponsibly and fine for adults when used responsibly. With this restriction in mind alcohol and tobacco retailers incorporate regulatory requirements into their retail operations as a requirement of permission to do business. A similar verification requirement for mobile services providers would be no more inconvenient, and in fact would likely be less so, since once a phone is registered to a minor, technology can automatically impose and maintain appropriate restriction on an ongoing basis with little human interaction.
Also on the subjects of payment and enforcement, we may consider who pays for the mobile technology carried by young people. A fully provisioned smartphone with texting and web costs roughly US $50 per month to operate. It is unlikely that tweens and teens signed up for and are paying for this service themselves; in most cases, parents must be footing the bill. Therefore as with societally imposed restrictions on parents providing alcohol and tobacco to minors, a restriction on providing access to mobile technology to minors would also be largely enforceable.
The social structure and social will already exist to regulate access to certain substances and activities based on age or other proof of responsibility. These systems are not foolproof, but they are reasonably effective a good deal of the time. Such limitations are imposed when society sees a greater benefit from the limitation than in free unfettered access. In the case of mobile technology, in light of the destructive behavior to which this technology has recently been put, and in the absence of a present body of thought regarding the propagation of this technology, perhaps the time has come for some consideration of the matter.