The allied conference at Yalta, 1945, was nothing short of an appeasement conference that sowed the seeds of the Cold War to follow, in which an impermeable chasm was generated between the two dominant systems of democracy and communism. An inherent misunderstanding of Russian politicking transformed into disagreement over Poland, the use of the atomic bomb on Japan, and a severed diplomacy that came about due to a lack of similarities in ideals as well as an absence of firmness on the part of the Allies-Churchill and Roosevelt.
The issue in Poland began long before Yalta. Despite fervent pleas for aid, Soviet troops stood by as Nazi forces ruthlessly crushed thousands of Poles in what came to be known as the Warsaw Uprising. Furthermore, the Treaty of Rapallo and later the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact clearly proved that Stalin could not be trusted; Churchill even implored the allies, when first rolling into Germany, to proceed as far east as Berlin and as far south as Prague, but this decision failed to manifest and Stalin emerged with the territorial upper hand in Europe. Knowing of growing Soviet influence in the east in conjunction with Russia’s insatiable hunger for territory, the allies should have taken a firm stance at Yalta, yet they sacrificed Poland to the Russians with little more than the promise of free elections. In truth, this was a fallacious face-saving move on the allies, as no allied troops were sent to enforce these elections nor were government officials sent to oversee the democratic process. Thus, the Wilsonian ideal of self-determination as imbued in the Atlantic Charter just months before was harshly swept aside in favor of appeasement in Eastern Europe to the seemingly overwhelming Russian forces.
Another glaring misstep at Yalta was the issue of Russia’s participation in the Pacific Theater following victory in Europe. The United States, reeling from heavy casualties at Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa sought the Soviets for aid in defeating Japan-FDR realized his mistake in inviting the spread of communism almost too late. What followed was a rushed campaign resulting in the forced use of the devastating atomic bomb, Soviet acquisition of the Kurile Islands and surrounding territory, and a divided Korea that would further aggravate the divide between communism and democracy in years to come. Although it may be argued that FDR was acting out of war-time necessity and that Soviet inclusion was necessary, this leaves out two key points: the possibility of a blockade of the island of Japan as well as allied intervention from the likes of Great Britain and France on the basis of strategic interests in areas such as Singapore and Indochina. Yet at Yalta, Stalin was given a blank-check invitation in the Far East and the US’s subsequent attempt to stymie Russia’s gains only fostered feelings of hostility that fed into the Cold War.
As George Kennan came to describe in documents such as the “Long Telegram,” Russian diplomacy and communist ideals were fundamentally different from the practices of the western world, and due to misunderstandings of these differences, there was no hope for reconciliation at Yalta or anywhere else for that matter. Stalin adhered closely to the robust policy of realpolitik at a time when the allies were weary of such a principle and instead preferred collective security. Furthermore, the post-WWII world called for multilateral diplomacy and the UN at a time when Russia’s diplomacy consisted largely of bullying smaller countries in systems of bilateral diplomacy. This misinterpretation quickly manifested in the decision to give Ukraine and Belarus, Russian satellite states, votes in the UN despite the fact that they could easily be controlled by the Kremlin. Additionally, Stalin could not understand the fundamental idealism of western democracies-to him concern over Poland and the concept of self-determination were a threat to his own preferred spheres of influence. Most importantly, however, communism saw a constant revolution of the proletariat against the world of capitalism, which western democracies perfectly embodied.
With an inevitable clash of ideals, the disagreements over Poland and other territories, and the mistaken policy of goodwill engendered towards Stalin’s touch diplomacy, it is no surprise that Yalta only exacerbated the origins of the Cold War. Fundamental differences between the worlds of communism and democracy could not be rectified at a single conference and due to inherent misunderstandings between the allies and Stalin, as well as a decision to back down rather than remaining steadfast on issues such as Poland, the Cold War began.
Sources:
Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace . New York: Doubleday, 1995. Print.
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy . New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Print.