“Bias in Historical Description, Interpretation, and Explanation” by C. Behan McCullagh speaks of the unfair accounts of past historians. For McCullagh, it is important for historians to recognize historical bias and to distinguish what one might call an unintentional bias from the bias that is done deliberately – historians must distinguish personal bias from cultural bias and cultural relativity.
McCullagh begins the article with a brief summation of the work of historians Hayden White and F.R. Ankersmit. Both of these historians have written groundbreaking historical work involving the subjectivity of narrative in history. While McCullagh acknowledges the contributions of both White and Ankersmit, he goes on to claim that there are historical standards that historians are expected to meet. McCullagh adds that both White and Ankersmit fail to consider their “cognitive functions.”
For McCullagh, there are four common ways in which historical writing can be biased. The first way in which these biases occur, according to McCullagh, is when historians misinterpret evidence. When historians do this, they are not justified in making the historical inferences that they make. In addition to misinterpreting evidence, historians can also omit significant facts about the historical moment – essentially rendering an unfair account. McCullagh also argues that historians can also offer a general description of the past that is unsubstantiated by facts. Finally, according to McCullagh, historical bias occurs when historians provide causal explanations of historical events without developing all or most of the potential causes.
In addition to illustrating these typical historical biases, McCullagh argues that their accounts are only biased accounts if they occur because the historian wants the outcomes to occur – essentially, the bias comes out because the historian is stacking the evidence to “prove” an outcome. If the biases come about as the result of an oversight or through “accident,” then the account is not biased, just unjustified. Essentially, historical bias only occurs as a result of the historian’s motivations. McCullagh goes on to add that the historian might be somewhat “blind” to these motivations as a result of being schooled in a particular brand of historical thinking. For example, a Marxist might see class struggle where there is none. Essentially, these biases need not be personal biases, they can also be cultural.
McCullagh notes that some philosophers would argue that personal bias is unavoidable because of the limitations of being human – essentially, humans cannot be expected to set aside their own interests and become impartial observers. In section two of the article, McCullagh argues that historical bias matters and that it should be eliminated. For McCullagh biased accounts of history masquerade as fair accounts of the subject and are, therefore, misleading. McCullagh also discusses the consequences of a biased rendering of history and claims that, as a result, injustice often occurs. He also claims that if historians misjudge or misunderstand the phenomenon that caused such history, they will be unable to prescribe a strategy for altering it.
In section three of the article, McCullagh discusses the anticipated responses to his claims. One of those claims in particular, the inevitability of subjectivity in historical accounts, is given special attention. This is where McCullagh grapples with the question of whether historical bias can be avoided. In section four, McCullagh argues that while complete detachment from one’s own historicity is impossible, there are rational standards of historical inquiry. He concludes that if historians would put their commitment to the discipline of history ahead of their commitment to their own personal agendas, then they would be able to maintain some form of objectivity in their work and avoid historical bias. Finally, in section five, McCullagh grapples with the objection that even if historians are fair minded, the historical materials that are available to them might still be biased. It is in section six where McCullagh claims that cultural bias is the only bias that historians cannot readily set aside and that there can be bias in spite of the historian’s commitment to fairness.
In the article, McCullagh uses a prescriptive tone to make claims about how one could correct or avoid personal bias in historical writing. His thought process shows a strong commitment to the historical profession as well as a strong commitment to the positivist, evidence based rendering of history. McCullagh shows that there are four main ways that historical bias can occur: 1.) misinterpreting evidence; 2.) omitting facts; 3.) offering conclusions unsubstantiated by evidence; and 4.) providing incomplete or inaccurate causal explanations. In addition, he shows that ideas (historical ideas in particular) have consequences and sometimes these ideas lead to material consequences. According to McCullagh, the best way for a historian to avoid these biases is to, above all, be fair. Essentially, historians must have a stronger commitment to the profession of history than the historian has to any particular rendering of history.